​Some popular views of Ernst Mach cast him as a philosopher-scientist averse to imaginative practices in science. The aim of this analysis is to address the question of whether or not imagination is compatible with Machian philosophy of science. I conclude that imagination is not only compatible, but essential to realizing the aim of science in Mach’s biologico-economical view. I raise the possible objection that my conclusion is undermined by Mach’s criticism of Isaac Newton’s famous “bucket experiment.” I conclude that Mach’s issue lies not with thought experimentation, tout court, but with the improper use of thought experimentation as it relates to the aim of the biologico-economical development of science.

Philosophers Alex Byrne and Tomás Bogardus have recently presented strong critiques of the sex/gender distinction, arguing that gender is a biological concept that is identical with sex. The questions to be asked, then, are whether or not a viable argument in favor of the sex/gender distinction can be put forth and, subsequently, whether medical researchers ought to maintain this commonly used distinction in practice. In this paper, I defend a positive answer to both questions.

​Working within a framework informed by John Dewey’s philosophy, I argue that the development of imaginative capacities is necessary for effective democratic participation of publics with respect to scientific and technological matters. I propose one valuable strategy for enhancing these imaginative capacities involves engagement with conceptual artworks. I hypothesize that such engagement may lead to an improved ability to discern representational force, a strengthened ability to entertain richer sets of possible interpretations, and a greater appreciation of the ways one’s interpretations are shaped by selective attention—all of which are required in a well-functioning democracy as understood in Deweyan terms.